No problems Peter. I agree that US foreign policy is somewhat inconsistent. Tariffing allies and partners does not make for great relationships. Nor does turning away from supporting Ukraine, You make an excellent point about the impact of these policies on the US defence industry. NATO's recent increase in defence spending will probably end up re-invigorating the European defence industry rather than being spent in America.
Thanks again Ben. The map you provide illustrating China's "First" and "Second" Island chains suggest to me that (in addition to Taiwan) Japan, South Korea and the Philippines are most at risk. While China's increasingly subversive activities across multiple other smaller Pacific Nations imply widespread (perhaps diversion tactics?).
The USA's tariff impositions on friendly nations and the USA's seeming withdrawal from NATO (and support from Ukraine) are added factors that must make former friendly nations nervous.
Japan and Germany are already rearming and have the capability to do so. This has and will continue to damage the USA's very profitable weapons industry... not to mention the USA's credibility among former friendly "western" nations.
I really appreciated the breakdown of how land-based U.S. forces inside the first and second island chains can counter China’s A2/AD strategy.
It seems like the U.S. is borrowing from the Houthi playbook here: widely dispersed, mobile missile units that are hard to target and cheap to sustain. But applying that at scale across the Pacific demands not just logistics, but political trust from a lot of small island nations.
How is the U.S. thinking about long-term basing rights and influence in places like Kiribati or Papua New Guinea, especially when China’s offering big checks with fewer strings?
Hi Luke, thanks for the feedback I'm glad its useful.
The Houthi are one example of the new way of war that we are watching develop, typically involving dispersion and area-denial. Ukraine provides another example, small dispersed infantry units supported by small numbers of vehicles and relying on drones, artillery and missiles to generate combat power. This is a different operational model to recent combined arms doctrine and needs to be studied and adapted too.
My answer to the question you asked is that I'm not sure about US policy, some of it is quite contradictory but I do believe we can see evidence of increasing Sino-American competition. And, in my opinion how that competition plays out is likely to be influenced by how each side plans to fight.
Appreciate the thoughtful reply. You’re right about Ukraine. Cheap drones, smart artillery, and small teams. That shift rewards countries that move fast and scale distributed systems without massive formations. If the US does opt for that style of warfare, it will be interesting to see how we execute with a much larger platform.
No problems, I am watching developments especially the 'democratisation' of precision-strike. Now any threat has the potential to hit targets accurately in depth. If you are interested in how the US is responding I suggest reading about Marine Littoral Regiments and the experimentation going on in 25th Infantry Division. It is also worth studying the UK's approach and how it has re-roled some of it cavalry regiments from tanks to very light-weight equipment.
No problems Peter. I agree that US foreign policy is somewhat inconsistent. Tariffing allies and partners does not make for great relationships. Nor does turning away from supporting Ukraine, You make an excellent point about the impact of these policies on the US defence industry. NATO's recent increase in defence spending will probably end up re-invigorating the European defence industry rather than being spent in America.
Thanks again Ben. The map you provide illustrating China's "First" and "Second" Island chains suggest to me that (in addition to Taiwan) Japan, South Korea and the Philippines are most at risk. While China's increasingly subversive activities across multiple other smaller Pacific Nations imply widespread (perhaps diversion tactics?).
The USA's tariff impositions on friendly nations and the USA's seeming withdrawal from NATO (and support from Ukraine) are added factors that must make former friendly nations nervous.
Japan and Germany are already rearming and have the capability to do so. This has and will continue to damage the USA's very profitable weapons industry... not to mention the USA's credibility among former friendly "western" nations.
I really appreciated the breakdown of how land-based U.S. forces inside the first and second island chains can counter China’s A2/AD strategy.
It seems like the U.S. is borrowing from the Houthi playbook here: widely dispersed, mobile missile units that are hard to target and cheap to sustain. But applying that at scale across the Pacific demands not just logistics, but political trust from a lot of small island nations.
How is the U.S. thinking about long-term basing rights and influence in places like Kiribati or Papua New Guinea, especially when China’s offering big checks with fewer strings?
Hi Luke, thanks for the feedback I'm glad its useful.
The Houthi are one example of the new way of war that we are watching develop, typically involving dispersion and area-denial. Ukraine provides another example, small dispersed infantry units supported by small numbers of vehicles and relying on drones, artillery and missiles to generate combat power. This is a different operational model to recent combined arms doctrine and needs to be studied and adapted too.
My answer to the question you asked is that I'm not sure about US policy, some of it is quite contradictory but I do believe we can see evidence of increasing Sino-American competition. And, in my opinion how that competition plays out is likely to be influenced by how each side plans to fight.
Appreciate the thoughtful reply. You’re right about Ukraine. Cheap drones, smart artillery, and small teams. That shift rewards countries that move fast and scale distributed systems without massive formations. If the US does opt for that style of warfare, it will be interesting to see how we execute with a much larger platform.
No problems, I am watching developments especially the 'democratisation' of precision-strike. Now any threat has the potential to hit targets accurately in depth. If you are interested in how the US is responding I suggest reading about Marine Littoral Regiments and the experimentation going on in 25th Infantry Division. It is also worth studying the UK's approach and how it has re-roled some of it cavalry regiments from tanks to very light-weight equipment.
Thanks for the suggestions, I'll check it out!
War is not peace Ben. Orwells 1984 is not a guidebook you should follow. You are the NZ version of this;
https://rogerboyd.substack.com/p/western-security-state-paranoid-schizophrenic