Pacific Brief - 6 July 2025

Discussing geo-political and military activity in the Pacific.

Chinese aircraft carriers exercise near Japan - China’s force projection capability is increasing

On 30 June, the People’s Liberation Army – Navy confirmed two Chinese aircraft carriers; PLANS Shandong and Liaoning exercised together in the Western Pacific. The ships conducted a range of drills practicing defensive and offensive operations.

The Chinese ships were shadowed by Japanese aircraft and ships, leading to allegations that Chinese fighter aircraft ‘buzzed’ a Japanese surveillance aircraft.

After the exercise PLANS Shandong travelled to Hong Kong for a port visit.

Exercising in this manner is not threatening but does indicate that China is seeking greater influence, specifically the ability to project military power beyond its local area. Aircraft carriers are a useful tool for projecting military power, and in conjunction with China’s growing amphibious warfare capabilities these ships are starting to provide the capability for Chinese military interventions far from home.

Generally, commentators focus on Taiwan but there are a range of lower risk areas that China where could project power using carriers and amphibious warfare ships. The South China Sea has several territories that are claimed by China, and further afield the nation has a growing network of security relationships that this ability to project military power could be used to support.

US Army Pacific Chief provides insight into Sino-American military competition

General Ronald Clark, commander of the US Army in the Pacific spoke at the Centre for Strategic Studies Land Power Dialogue in Washington on 27 June, providing further insight into US planning.

The general discussed China’s commitment to learning from current conflicts. He reported that China is actively studying operations around the world, analysing technological and tactical developments. Specifically aiming to increase its ability to conduct ‘joint operations’, a military term that means land, sea and air forces working together. The US and its allies have a long history of joint operations, and this is a key military advantage these nations hold over to China.

Clark’s observation of recent Chinese exercises and deployments was that “We’re starting to see them operate in a joint environment.” A noteworthy trend indicating that China is developing its joint operations capabilities. However, he also observed that China still lags the US in this field noting that “It’s not joint integration at this point, but it’s joint operations, side by side between air, maritime and land domain forces — unlike anything we’ve seen before.”

The general also discussed combatting China’s area-denial strategy, the development and deployment of long-range missiles to keep US aircraft carriers at ‘arms length.’ A strategy that the US is working hard to counter, Clark stating that "What they have not accounted for is our ability to provide access through multidomain operations from the land.” A statement reinforcing how important US land bases are in a future conflict.

Specifically, land bases within the ‘First and Second Island Chains.’ The First Island Chain stretches from Japan in the north, through Taiwan, the northern Philippines and then south into the South China Sea. Parts of this area are already subject to Chinese territorial claims. The Second Island Chain is immediately east of the First and includes Japan’s Bonin Islands, the remainder of the Philippines, Guam and then south to Western Papua New Guinea.

Clark discussed US aims stating that "Our ability to be able to gain positional advantage is all tied to our efforts to campaign inside the first and second island chains, to build positional advantage through our engagements, through our operations, through our activities and investments in the [Indo-Pacific] region." In lay terms, the general’s point is that containing China requires the US and its allies secure and hold territory within the First and Second Island Chains.

Land bases in the First and Second Island Chains are required because US plans to defeat China’s area-denial strategy require the US to deploy land-based missiles inside the range of Chinese area-denial capabilities. On land US anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles can be widely dispersed and easily hidden, making them much more difficult targets for satellites to spot than ships on the ocean. This is a notable example of the US learning from its adversaries. For example, the Houthi insurgents operate in a similar manner using missiles and drones to attack ships in the Red Sea. Houthi missiles are widely dispersed, well-hidden and hard to locate.

Supporting a widely dispersed ground force like the US envisages, requires new support concepts. The US Multi Domain Task Force is one of the formations designed to support ground forces operating this way by providing long-range missile fire, the ability to maintain communications with satellites, electronic warfare capabilities and information operations.

Additionally, the US is also establishing caches of pre-positioned equipment and stores dispersed across potential conflict zones. The objective is that in a future conflict with China, US troops will already be within the area-denial zone with the stores and equipment they need for immediate operations. China’s missiles may be able to stop reinforcements arriving immediately, but US forces will be ready and able to prosecute their plans.

US plans also include the development of larger, widely distributed logistics hubs in places like Australia, Japan, Guam, Philippines and Singapore, that can manage the flow of supplies to US and allied forces. By dispersing logistics support in this manner, the US mitigates the risk of its logistics hubs being wiped out in a pre-emptive strike.

Recent large investments in Australian defence infrastructure and industry provide a second route for strategic logistics support. Historically, logistics support from the US mainland to potential future combat zones in Asia is via Hawaii, Guam, Japan and Philippines. But by working together with Australia, the US is building a second strategic logistics route from Australia, north into potential conflict zones.

Another notable point is Clark’s commitment to maintaining a US presence in the Pacific, and to providing a deterrent to China’s increasing assertiveness. The general observing that "Our ability to be present, to give them an alternative, specifically in the security arena, is very, very important. So, presence matters." A key message, that has been reinforced in recent months by Admiral Paparo, US Commander Indo-Pacific and by the US Defence Secretary, Peter Hegseth.

Listening to senior officers talk provides a picture of how their country plans to fight, and information to assess regional implications. Clark’s statements reinforce previous observations about US and Chinese war-fighting strategies in the Pacific, specifically that both sides need bases on land to successfully deliver their plans.

This means that competition for bases using ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power will intensify. This year from Kiribati to the Cook Islands there are allegations of inappropriate Chinese influence in several small Pacific nations. China is eager to extend its potential for area-denial further east and building a network of friendly ports, and airfields provides opportunities for missile locations in a future conflict.

Current American dialogue indicates that the US intends to compete, and is building up its Pacific military machine, pre-positioning forces to contain China. A commitment that will probably translate into more Sino-American competition across the Pacific, America and its allies using ‘soft power’ to shut China out of small Pacific nations.

Melanesian update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Timor Leste’s shipping register fraudulently hijacked

International maritime insurer Lloyds Lists reported last week that fraudsters had established a fake Timor Leste shipping register, that eight ships are registered too. A blow for the small nation that is aiming to re-establish a legitimate register of ships paying to sail under its flag.

Any ship operating on the high seas must fly the flag of the nation it is registered in. The country it is registered with is then responsible for enforcement of safety standards and regulations onboard the ship. Ship owners can choose to register their ships in any nation, and may want to operate at lower costs or evade high safety standards in their home countries so register with other countries. Several small Pacific nations allow shipping companies to register their vessels through them because it provides revenue.

However, this system is not without risk because unscrupulous shipping operators can take advantage of smaller countries, with less resource to monitor their registers, to list ships involved in illegal activities. For instance, earlier this year Cook Islands registered ships were alleged to be involved in Russian sponsored damage to submarine data cables in the Baltic and carrying Russian oil to evade export sanctions.

In Timor Leste’s case the situation is different, instead of a poorly monitored register this case involves a fraudulent entity setting up a fake register and enrolling ships. International regulators are currently working with Timor Leste authorities to shut the fake register down, and as Lloyds Lists points out “Timor-Leste is by no means the only government struggling to contain the recent outbreak of fraudulent registries being established apparently without their knowledge. Last month, Lloyd’s List revealed how the government of Malawi had been targeted in an almost identical scam where at least four sanctioned tankers started using a fictitious flag.”

Ships using false flags and the reliability of smaller nation’s shipping registers is clearly an international problem but is likely to become a larger issue in the South West Pacific. A region full of small nations with limited sources of revenue for which operating shipping registers is a potential income stream.

Vanuatu changes information laws

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation reports that Vanuatu’s government has passed an amendment to the nation’s Right to Information Act. The amendment means that the government’s Council of Ministers discussion can be kept secret from the public. A change that reduces government accountability, and has caused concern in the small nation.

During a period of intense diplomatic competition in the Pacific transparency is vital because it reduces the risk of inappropriate foreign influence, or allegations of it. Small Pacific nations like Vanuatu are under diplomatic pressure from larger powers and under commercial pressure from large companies, meaning any government decision could be influenced. Transparency is the best defence against corruption, or divisive claims of inappropriate influence. Hopefully, opposition to the changes will be strong enough to force Vanuatu’s government to reconsider this decision.