Pacific Brief 1 September 2024

Australia’s defence university sets new rules for Chinese interaction

Last week, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported that the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), the nation’s military university is tightening its rules on collaboration with China.  ADFA is a branch of the University of New South Wales, located in Canberra that provides university courses for members of the Australian military.

ADFA aims to end visits by Chinese academics and to limit collaborative research projects. This is a noteworthy step. Like several other nations Australia is worried about Chinese information gathering operations and is taking steps to limit access to its military academic programmes. However, the University of New South Wales will continue to maintain academic relationships with Chinese institutions.

Australia’s Shadow Home Affairs Minister, James Paterson praised ADFA’s decision and requested removal of all academics with close links to China, stating that “No academic with ties to the Chinese government should be employed there with access to the next generation of ADF officers. Defence must issue an urgent 'please explain' to UNSW about these apparent connections and any security risk they present." Paterson also noted the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2022 report, ‘National Security Risks affecting the Australian Higher Education and Research Sector’ that highlighted the risk of foreign interference in academic institutions and made 27 recommendations to government to reduce these risks.  The Australian Defence Force’s policy is an indication of the nation’s concern about Chinese espionage in academic institutions, whether aimed at building influence or gathering information. 

New Zealand academic discusses risk of Chinese interference in New Caledonia

A topic of discussion at the Pacific Islands Forum is New Caledonia’s current political situation, and the risk it poses to Pacific security.  Violent conflict in any nation, undermines social institutions creating power vacuums that external powers may use to increase their influence.  If French colonial power wanes, other nations may seek advantage either supporting the existing regime or emergent political groups.

A New Zealand academic, Professor Anne-Marie Brady recently discussed a specific risk that New Caledonia faces in an era of Sino-American competition, Chinese interference.  Brady authored a report titled ‘When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia’ for the Australian Strategic Policy Initiative. The report describes the security risk posed by political instability in New Caledonia, specifically the risk of China using the situation to develop further political or military influence in the colony.

Brady explains why New Caledonia is useful real estate, providing detailed information about its military importance. The report discusses how the colony’s location is good for monitoring maritime traffic through the Torres Strait.  An area of ocean that serves as an alternative shipping route if the Straits of Malacca are compromised by events in the South China Sea. New Caledonia’s location also makes it an important part of France’s electronic intelligence network, gathering information from across Melanesia, Polynesia and the Southern Pacific.  Essentially, New Caledonia is strategically located, has a good harbour, and airfields so is an important piece of military real estate for any power interested in the South West Pacific.

Another noteworthy point in the report is that some parts of the independence movement see potential benefits in taking advantage of the island’s strategic location. The report states:” In 2021, a report issued by the pro-independence group FLNKS proposed two scenarios for the defence of an independent New Caledonia: (1) New Caledonia could establish defence agreements with a neighbouring power, which could be Australia, or France, or ‘another country’; or (2) it could follow the Djibouti model.”  

Djibouti sits on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key shipping route between Europe, the Persian Gulf and Asia so the nation rents land for military bases to other nations. China’s first overseas base is in Djibouti and the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Japan also have military bases in the nation.  Djibouti may receive valuable revenue from these arrangements but must also manage the rivalries between these nations, a de-stabilising influence. A new regime acting this way may be unlikely, but should not be completely discounted. 

Brady’s report also discusses whether China has the means and intent to intervene and finds that “PRC (People’s Republic of China) entities and their agents have engaged in a range of foreign interference activities in New Caledonia over five decades, targeting political elites, and attempting to use the ethnic Chinese diaspora and Chinese companies as tools of CCP (Chinese Communist Party) interests.” Essentially, that China has spent many years building local networks that could be used to gain more influence. In the report, Brady provides evidence of extensive long-term operations to influence politics in the colony.

‘When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia’ is a detailed report, and hard to do justice to in a short form column, so I suggest reading it here: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/when-china-knocks-door-new-caledonia . The report also provides recommendations for managing the risk posed by potential Chinese operations to extend its influence, including arguing for the potential benefits of France maintaining a long-term economic and security role in the area even if New Caledonia becomes independent.

In my opinion, Brady’s report reinforces the need for the Pacific Islands Forum and larger nations like the US, Australia, Japan and New Zealand to take an active interest in supporting discussions about the New Caledonia’s future. Staying a French colony is not a solution, the Kanak people’s desire for independence is too strong. France needs be looking at realistic options for transferring New Caledonia to independence, or providing much more local autonomy.  New Caledonia’s Pacific neighbours should help France to understand that de-colonisation is inevitable, and is a process that needs to managed carefully.

Brady’s report argues for more open discussions about security issues. A method to reduce the effectiveness of espionage operations that aim to covertly increase the local political influence of external powers.  Additionally, the report argues that neighbouring states should help New Caledonia diversify its markets reducing the nation’s economic dependence on China.

If the Pacific community does to support this discussion, New Caledonia faces a greater risk of falling into further conflict. New Caledonia’s location means that many larger powers, not only China are likely to take advantage of the political situation and use diplomacy and covert influence for their own strategic gain. 

Pacific leaders endorse Australian ‘Pacific Police Support Group’ plan

This week, Pacific leaders endorsed an Australian-funded plan to improve police resources in the Pacific. In June, we discussed the proposed plan that includes Australia building a new police training centre in Brisbane, to train police staff from other Pacific nations. 

The plan’s aim is that the new centre will train police officers to a high standard, developing a reserve of well-trained staff that can be deployed to support small police forces across the Pacific.  A programme now officially titled the ‘Pacific Police Support Group,’ and aiming to provide an international pool of approximately 200 officers able to respond to natural disasters or serious violent threats like rioting.

The plan aims to improve stability in the South West Pacific by providing a well-trained group of Pacific police officers able to deploy quickly into trouble spots. Many parts of the Pacific have unique cultural traditions and perspectives that local people are more familiar with, and can work more effectively within. Essentially, this project appears to be a recognition that operational effectiveness in the South West Pacific requires local knowledge and cultural sensitivity.

The plan is expensive costing roughly $ 400 million and takes Australia’s financial commitment to training Pacific police forces to approximately $700 million this financial year.

Australia’s strategic goal is clearly to block China from using police support to gain influence in the South West Pacific.  Involvement in local police forces provides very good access to local intelligence and political influence, so is currently an area of Sino-Australian competition.  China regularly offering equipment, training and staff support to small Pacific nations.  A situation that Australia and the US are very concerned about, the Pacific Police Support Group and training centre are responses to this perceived threat.

Melanesian update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Papua New Guinea Prime Minister probably faces another ‘No Confidence’ vote

James Marape, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea will return to parliament next week facing the prospect of another ‘No Confidence’ motion. Papua New Guinea’s opposition has proposed two previous ‘No Confidence’ motions, both of which have been defeated. 

Votes of ‘No Confidence’ are becoming a common political tactic in the smaller nations of the Pacific.  The impact of their over-use is to undermine public trust in government because they distract from the important leadership role that parliaments play in democratic societies. In my opinion, Marape’s nation faces significant economic and social issues, so time spent debating ‘No Confidence’ motions is time wasted.

Solomon Islands raise issue of Pacific Islands Forum membership -Sino-American competition?

An issue for the Pacific Islands Forum is the membership of non-independent states, for instance New Caledonia, a French colony is a member.  Recently, states like American Samoa and Guam are seeking membership and senior Solomon Islands diplomat Colin Beck has stated that the forum needs a ‘tough talk’ about membership.

Last week, the Australian reported that Solomon Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter Shanel Agovaka intends to extend the discussion about membership to include down grading Taiwan’s recognition within the forum.  If true, this is an unfortunate demonstration of how small Pacific nations are used by larger powers to support their diplomatic objectives, in this case China seeking international support for the claim that Taiwan is not independent. 

Meanwhile Palau, a nation that does recognise Taiwan, takes the opposite position and opposes any discussion about downgrading its status.  This situation means the forum could split in political camps over the issue creating a divisive and politicised atmosphere.

 US and Chinese delegations are both present at the forum led by senior officials; US Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell and Chinese Special Envoy, Qian Bo respectively. Evidence of how important the Pacific Islands Forum is for networking and politicking by both major powers, increasing existing tensions and changing the focus of the forum.  This is a trend that Pacific states are increasingly having to manage, discussions about economic development and climate change that are the current focus being overtaken by major power politics like the international status of Taiwan.

West Papua update

The Melanesian Spearhead Group met at the Pacific Islands Forum and have issued another call for a meeting with Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto about West Papua.  The group has been calling for a formal visit since 2019, a call that has not been answered by Indonesia.

A recent UN report criticised Indonesian actions in the province, where is fighting a war to suppress an independence movement.  A war that although seldom reported show no signs of ending and that creates a significant threat to security in the South West Pacific.