Lessons about the evolution of indirect fire relevant to potential conflicts in the South-West Pacific

Currently, South-West Pacific nations face a rapidly evolving security environment that has potential for both near-peer and asymmetric conflict. Indirect fire is not at the forefront of military discussions in the region. However, evidence from recent conflict suggests that it worth discussing and this article briefly highlights some potential trends and identifies potential lessons for armies in this region, or considering deployment to area.

Lightweight, low-cost, loitering munitions and drones may replace mortar and artillery ‘immediate neutralisation’ missions

A tactical evolution that South-West Pacific armies should consider is the use of drones for immediate ‘neutralisation missions.’ In my opinion, small man portable drones like Switchblade or Ukraine’s homemade FPV drones are precursors for new indirect fire tactics.  Weapons like this can be carried within a section, squad or platoon and provide very accurate immediate neutralisation of targets, even in defilade. This task used to be a role of infantry mortars, automatic grenade launchers and close support artillery but the advantages of drones in this role are significant.

Drone indirect fire is immediate, and highly accurate. Additionally, it does not unmask more powerful assets like mortars and artillery. Another advantage in the thick jungles of many potential Pacific combat zones is that drones can observe from above and be flown directly onto a target.  An observer directing indirect fire from ground level cannot hunt out a target from above, without using a separate aerial surveillance asset.  Further, contact in jungle is often at very close-range making adjustment of artillery and mortars slow and therefore more dangerous.

Currently, using loitering munitions and FPV drones in forest can be difficult, dense foliage providing concealment and making it hard to navigate light-weight aerial vehicles. Hence the development of Ukraine’s ‘dragon drones’ that drop rain thermite onto enemy forces hidden under trees. However, surveillance technology is improving quickly and as AI becomes more prevalent and integrated into munitions it seems likely that these issues will reduce.  Drones and loitering munitions acquiring sensors able to ‘hunt’ through a canopy, and AI assisted navigation helping to navigate a munition through trees to a target.

Another important feature of loitering munitions and FPV drones that is very relevant to small or low-intensity conflict is that the reduction in collateral damage compared to conventional tube artillery. The accuracy and small size of these weapons makes them an ideal solution for supporting infantry in highly complex stability operations. A type of operation that based on history is highly likely in the South-West Pacific. 

‘Dumb’ indirect fire is still important

Although weapons like Switchblade have the potential to fill the need for fast and effective immediate neutralisation, ‘dumb’ indirect fire retains a range of advantages that mean it will be required into the future. A key lesson from the Ukraine War is that massed indirect fire is still important.  Infantry mortars and light guns provide a heavy weight of fire that will be difficult for drones to match for some time.

Even under the intense surveillance by drones and mortar locating radars these weapons systems are surviving and thriving in Ukraine.  Probably by firing short, high-intensity missions at pre-selected targets. For instance, short bursts of preparatory fire before an attack; or Final Protective Fire missions close by friendly defences to stop an enemy attack.  An 81 mm infantry mortar can fire 20 rounds in a minute, a 105mm gun 6-8, both providing a significant amount of explosive on a target, in a very short period.

Modern GPS and Inertial Navigation System survey equipment improves accuracy and reduces, or eliminates the need for adjustment.  Meaning guns and mortar can remain hidden with multiple targets loaded, ready to engage.  When the call for fire is made response is instant, probably quicker than swarming drones to a target. Small weapons like mortars and towed light guns are relatively easy to dig in or camouflage providing greater survivability. 

Additionally, fighting in Ukraine and Afghanistan demonstrates that cannon and mortar precision-guided munitions are considerably more lethal that unguided projectiles.  Essentially, a fire mission to destroy a platoon position that may require more than a hundred rounds of unguided artillery ammunition, might be replaced with 20-30 rounds of precision-guided ammunition.   A feature of fighting in the South-West Pacific is the difficulty of maintaining supply lines in the region’s complex terrain. If artillery fire is more accurate, less ammunition is required, and therefore less logistics support.  Dumb artillery, firing smart rounds appears to be a sound investment for armies preparing to fight in the South-West Pacific.

Drones in counter battery operations

Reports from Ukraine indicate that drones are becoming key counter-battery weapons. The benefit of drones being that they can search out and destroy individual artillery pieces. Further, drones can defeat artillery that is ‘shooting and scooting,’ because guns are easily spotted from the air when they are moving. A moving target is easier to spot than a well-concealed static target. 

Another noteworthy point is that unlike artillery fire, FPV drone signature is hard to detect, operating at low-altitude, small attack drones are hard for radar to identify. Unlike, mortar or artillery shells that travel to high-altitudes, above trees, houses and ground clutter, drones operate at ‘nape of the earth,’ amongst these features.  This means that drone launch points are harder to locate, and therefore counter attack is more difficult.  

Overtime, anti-drone measures will be developed but the evolving drone versus artillery battle needs to be studied. This type of combat requires ‘drone depth’ or utilising layers of different sized surveillance drones working together with ground-based observers to locate enemy artillery, that can be targeted by strike drones.   

‘Inter-operability’ is a term used to describe the mechanics for sharing information between different elements of ‘sensor – shooter’ network.  It involves the integration of information flow and command between either; different branches of the same nation’s military, or with allied forces. 

 A noteworthy feature of any potential future conflict in the South-West Pacific, is that it is likely to involve a coalition of diverse forces.  Highlighting a key planning consideration - The different levels of technical sophistication between militaries likely to be operating together in the region. For instance, larger partners are likely to contribute large and medium-sized drones, that will need to be able to share information.  The US and Australia are highly inter-operable, as are US allies like the UK.  But what happens when other nations join a coalition; Can they become inter-operable and share information freely?  Or call for fire? 

New Zealand and other European or large Asian nations joining a US or Australian led coalition probably have the necessary equipment and training to integrate and operate in this environment. But, what about the smaller nations within the region? Added complexity is provided by small hand-held drones that are quickly becoming ubiquitous amongst all nations and will need to be integrated into the ‘sensor – shooter’ network.

In simple terms, all the drone surveillance in the world is useless if information cannot be shared in a timely manner. In the South-West Pacific there are vast differences in the levels of inter-operability between potential coalition partners. This is a key issue because any politically meaningful coalition requires all partners to be fully engaged.  A coalition is quickly undermined if targeting information and strike resources are not shared with smaller nations in an equitable manner.

Say ‘Hello’ to fire control apps

A feature of Ukraine’s tactical success is the Kropyva computerised tactical information and fire control system. The system was developed around 2014-16 and is now maturing in service. Essentially, Kropyva is an app running on the Android operating system. Kropyva maps where friendly and enemy forces are, and allows units to transfer information about their situation to each other digitally. This means that tactical information can be shared immediately and accurately between vehicles, or between units.

However, Kropyva also integrates drones and ballistic calculations into the network.  For instance, drone footage can be shared instantly with a tank, a mortar detachment or an artillery battery that receives not just information about the target, but also the ballistic data to immediately engage the target.  

Kropyva provides Ukraine’s units with excellent situational awareness, and the ability to utilise any weapons system that is in range to engage Russian targets, all from what is essentially an ‘app.’ A system like this is probably the death knell for specific fire-control computers or programmes because the ballistic data for any weapon system, is a relatively small package of data that can easily be accessed stored and accessed using an app. Further, modern information systems make it easy to cross-match ballistic data with digital maps, providing fast and accurate ballistic solutions.

Using an app, means that almost any soldier can identify a target and ‘call for fire’ from any indirect or direct fire asset.  Fire control of this nature is a significant combat multiplier in coalition operations. Imagine, simply sharing an app that allows anyone with access to ‘call for fire’ that immediately integrates a multi-national force’s fire control. Obviously, this requires secure hardware and networks, but Ukraine is already demonstrating the usefulness of this type of fire-control.

This level of accessibility also raises questions about ‘fires’ management, or ensuring that sensible checks on ammunition expenditure and target prioritisation are undertaken to avoid wasting resources.  Further, as AI becomes more prevalent questions need to be answered about – If or when, human checks are required on fire control?  It is easy to visualise scenarios, like Final Protective Fires, in which the command to ‘fire’ is automated based on a set of agreed conditions or cues.

And, in a future South-West Pacific conflict involving coalition forces, these types of questions are of paramount importance.  Who is authorised to fire, which weapons and when? Questions that will be the basic building blocks of any coalition’s governance because trust is built on extending these privileges. Therefore, large nations like Australia or the US that may lead coalitions in the region needs to start thinking about how to build smaller militaries into fire control systems and processes.

Thinking about long-range precision-strike

Recent conflicts have highlighted the increasing use of cheap, easily acquired rockets and drones that can accurately hit targets at great distances. For instance, in the Red Sea Houthi insurgents are deploying a wide range of sea and air drones, along with missiles to target shipping moving through the area. Additionally, they have launched long-range attacks on targets in Israel more than 1,000 km from their home territory. 

In the South-West Pacific, this means a force dominating areas in Melanesia can feasibly attack numerous shipping lanes, or even targets in other nations.   A potential threat that needs to be appreciated and mitigated. 

Further, long-range missile fire including Naval Strike Missiles, GMLRS, ATACMs and Tomahawk will be available to any US or Australian led coalition in the South-West Pacific.  And, planning for integration of their fire control to achieve inter-operability is required because any coalition partner will want to know if their soldiers can call for fire from these weapons. Who authorises that fire? How is this process organised?  Another example of an area in which planning ahead, to manage the governance of fire control within diverse coalitions will greatly improve operational outcomes.